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Entrepreneurs exit their businesses due to selection pressures they experience in
the market place. In addition to this well-known ex-post decision to exit, entre-
preneurs select ex-ante whether they are willing to pursue an entrepreneurial
career at all, or to give up their entrepreneurial intentions. Hardly anything is
known about the latter selection process in imagined markets that precedes the
creation of variation and selection process in real markets. This article explores
these two selection processes using survey data on 20,000 individuals in
27 European countries and the United States in 2007. We distinguish business
failure from exit by sell-off. Individuals in the United States are less likely to exit
imagined markets and are more likely to exit the real market than are Europeans.
Individuals in a corporatist welfare state regime have relatively high chances to exit
imagined markets but low chances to exit real markets (due to failure). Business
owners in metropolitan and urban environments are more likely to fail than their
rural counterparts, while individuals with a high risk tolerance and individuals
with a self-employed parent are less likely to exit imagined or real markets
(via business failure). In short, this study shows that exit in real and in imagined
markets is differently affected by individual characteristics as well as by the
competitive and institutional environment.
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Entrepreneurs are important drivers of variation in the economy (Metcalfe, 1997;
Baumol, 2002). Without variation, there is no selection or learning and hence no
economic progress (Audretsch et al., 2004). Economic progress hinges on the essen-
tial mechanisms of the creation of variation and the operation of selection. Creation
of variation is often analyzed by investigating the entry of new firms, whereas selec-
tion is analyzed by investigating the exit of incumbent firms (ex-post selection).
In the evolutionary approach, the creation of new organizations does not only
involve new variation but also includes ex-ante selection, as the persons involved
evaluate whether an opportunity can be turned into a business, which is sufficiently
profitable in the sense that its foundation offsets the (opportunity) costs involved.
However, pre-entry market selection (ex-ante selection) has hardly received any
attention (Barnett et al., 2003). Two environmental characteristics drive the entry
decision: the munificence of opportunities and the availability of resources.
The combination of these two characteristics and the individual’s evaluation of the
potential business make the nascent entrepreneur decide to start a firm. Without
opportunities, persons will not be triggered to take any action to start a new firm,
and without resources, nascent entrepreneurs are likely to be frustrated in the
pursuit of the opportunities.
Post-entry market selection is a much better researched phenomenon (Mata and
Portugal, 1994; Mata et al., 1995) than pre-entry market selection. An important
reason for the lack of empirical research on ex-ante selection processes resides in the
difficulty of obtaining data about nascent entrepreneurs (Reynolds, 1997; Van
Gelderen et al., 2005) or pre-producer firms (Jovanovic, 2004; Carroll and
Khessina, 2005). In other words, there is little available information about the risk
set from which entry selection processes must be selected. Such studies require
drawing samples of individuals from the entire population (instead of census-based
firm data), which is often difficult for researchers to accomplish. This also involves
a shift of level of analysis from the firm to the person (Scott and Rosa, 1996;
Shane and Khurana, 2003).
A theoretical reason for the neglect of ex-ante selection is that in mainstream
economics, ex-ante and ex-post selection are often treated as being close to
observationally equivalent: ex-ante selection by rational actors and ex-post market
selection are said to deliver the same outcomes. This assumes that foresight is perfect.
According to Alchian (1950), the probability of entry and the probability of survival
are likely to be interrelated. However, the presence of uncertainty and incomplete
information (i.e. the absence of perfect foresight) makes it likely that these two
probabilities differ. In the organizational ecology paradigm, two selection processes
are distinguished that do not necessarily align: involuntary unemployment or forced
retirement can be expected to increase the likelihood of attempting to found a new
business but may not increase its odds of success, and conversely, a strong regulatory










regime may decrease the rate of attempts but increase the success rate of those that
do (Carroll and Khessina, 2005). Widely held notions of bounded rationality also
suggest that while expectations about the future may guide individual behavior,
common social situations are filled with uncertainty, ambiguity, and imperfect
information, thereby making the equation of ex-ante with ex-post selection unreal-
istic (compare the distinction between intrafirm selection and market selection,
which can be traced back to Nelson and Winter, 1982). The economics profession
in general focuses on revealed preferences (ex-post selection) instead of stated
preferences and the decision process that precedes the revealed preference (ex-ante
selection). This drives the study of the differences between pre-entry and post-entry
market selection outside the scope of the dominant debates.
In a societal context, both types of exits are highly relevant. Exit before
business start-up does have positive consequences: it could prevent excess entry
(Camerer and Lovallo, 1999), overinvestment, and the waste of resources.
However, a negative consequence might be the absence of experimentation (new
variety) and (entrepreneurial) learning. Exit after business start-up might have
private losses and the waste of resources (in the form of sunk costs) as a negative
consequence but possible individual and vicarious learning about entrepreneurship
and markets (Knott and Posen, 2005) as a positive result. These negative
consequences are not present when the firm exits via a sell-off: resources are not
wasted with this mode of exit, and it might even include private gains (Holmes
and Schmitz, 1990; Stam et al., 2008). People that have faced the market with
their own business are likely to be better informed about markets than those
who have never entered the market with their own business. Market forces provide
feedback to entrepreneurs in a more immediate, concrete, and blunt way than
many other settings where expertise is attained. This is why “market experience”
may have positive learning effects beyond the life of the entrepreneur’s firm (Stam
et al., 2008).
In this article, we analyze both ex-ante and ex-post selection processes using a
large survey of the European and US adult population. We define entrepreneurship
as having the intention or taking efforts to become a business owner, or currently
owning a business (Hyytinen and Ilmakunnas, 2007). Exit before business start-up
(ex-ante selection) depends on the market expectations of the nascent entrepreneur
(imagined markets), while exit after business start-up (ex-post selection) is more
likely to be affected by the (revealed, real) market selection process. There has been
a long debate in industrial economics and organizational ecology on selection
processes (Alchian, 1950; Winter, 1971; Geroski, 2001; Barnett et al., 2003).
However, research in these fields generally only includes revealed preferences. Our
study also takes stated preferences and the decision to exit the population of nascent
entrepreneurs into account. More specifically, these two exit processes are closely
related to recent debates in research on the recognition, evaluation, and exploitation
of entrepreneurial opportunities (Shane and Venkataraman, 2000). There has been










much research on the recognition and exploitation of opportunities but little is
known about their evaluation. This evaluation can be done by the entrepreneur,
which may lead to giving up the pursuit of a business opportunity. Better known
is the evaluation by the market, i.e. the external selection environment of businesses
already in operation, which may lead to the closure of a business. The two selection
processes can also be conceived as two types of exit from the entrepreneurial
process: (i) Exit after opportunity recognition (“I thought of starting a business,
or I had already taken steps to start a business, but gave up”); and (ii) Exit after
opportunity exploitation. This second type of exit is investigated under two circum-
stances: “I once started a business, but currently I am no longer an entrepreneur since
business has failed,” and “I once started a business, but currently I am no longer an
entrepreneur since business was sold, transferred, or closed.” The first option is the
best indicator of market selection.
The contributions of this article are the analyses of the role of ecological and
personal characteristics in ex-ante and ex-post market selection and of the differences
in the explanations of entrepreneurial exit in imagined and real markets, respectively.
In addition, we refine the exit in real markets by distinguishing between exit due to
business failure and exit due to sell-off. We take into account characteristics related
to personality and human capital, while the ecological characteristics reflect levels of
environmental munificence, levels of competition, and welfare state arrangements.
Unlike prior studies with an evolutionary approach, we do not take the organization
as the unit of selection; instead, we focus on the (potential) entrepreneur who has
specific cognitive and other abilities. There are at least two arguments in favor of
taking the individual person instead of the firm as the level of analysis: first, in the
case of ex-ante selection, a firm does not (yet) exist, and second, most firms—even in
advanced capitalist economies—are dominated by the entrepreneur. In Europe, the
majority of formally registered firms involve less than two persons (European
Commission, 2004). By combining both personal and ecological factors, we bring
together the traits and rates approaches (Aldrich and Wiedenmayer, 1993).
The main research question in this article is “How can entrepreneurial exit in real
and imagined markets be explained?” In addition we will discuss the differences
between the explanation of exit in real markets and in imagined markets. The article
starts with a discussion of the causes of entrepreneurial exit in real and imagined
markets. Next, the data and method are presented. In the succeeding section, we
present and interpret the outcomes of our empirical study. The article ends with
our conclusion.
2. Entrepreneurial exit
Once the entrepreneur has entered the market with her new firm, she has to face the
real—and not just the imagined—market selection. Most research, particularly in
economics, has studied the (relative) importance of firm- and industry-specific










variables explaining firm exit. Some stylized facts in this tradition are that firm exit is
negatively related to firm (start-up) size, firm age, the number of plants operated by
the firm, and the industry growth rate, and firm exit is positively related to the extent
of entry in the industry (Mata and Portugal, 1994; Ilmakunnas and Topi, 1999).
However, to understand new firm formation (including pre-entry market selec-
tion) and survival, one must understand the way individuals aspire and take action to
start a firm (Shane and Khurana, 2003). In their analysis of firm survival, Cefis and
Marsili (2005) also make a plea for taking into account the characteristics of entre-
preneurs when explaining the survival of new firms. The few economic studies of
firm exit that consider personal characteristics find ambiguous effects of age and a
negative effect of several kinds of human capital, such as general education and
industry experience (Bates, 1990; Van Praag, 2003). There has been some research
outside economics on the relationship between the entrepreneur’s personality and
firm exit (Ciavarella et al., 2004), but knowledge of the relation between personal
characteristics and firm exit remains scarce. In the present article, we focus on
entrepreneurial exit, i.e. the decision to quit an entrepreneurial career. This is not
necessarily the same as firm exit because entrepreneurs may own several firms at the
same time (“portfolio entrepreneurship”) or successively (“serial entrepreneurship”),
or individuals may quit their entrepreneurial career by selling their business.
Many people never think about being an entrepreneur. This group of individuals
can hardly be thought of as being at risk of becoming an entrepreneur or as being
confronted with market forces in a process of economic selection (Alchian, 1950).
However, this particular group cannot be neglected in the analysis of entrepreneurial
exit, which will be shown later. Undoubtedly, people who are thinking about starting
a business (Blanchflower et al., 2001; Grilo and Irigoyen, 2006; Grilo and Thurik,
2008), or who are even taking steps to start a business (Reynolds, 1997; Davidsson,
2006), are at risk of becoming an entrepreneur (nascent entrepreneurs). They have to
take into account the market forces that confront them after the business has been
started. This implies that they have to develop expectations about the market forces
that will eventually determine the viability of their future business. The closer they
come to the entry of the market, the more likely they will have developed an image of
the selection environment. This suggests that individuals who have started a business
have better insights into the selection environment than individuals that are only
thinking or trying to set up a business. Studies on nascent entrepreneurship have
focused mainly on individual-level explanations. We will explicitly take into account
different elements of the environment, such as the perceived resource availability of
the environment, the degree of urbanization (a proxy for resource availability and
competition), and the national institutional system. This latter element relates to
a study by Henrekson (2005), which shows how key welfare state institutions tend to
reduce economic incentives for entrepreneurship.
In order to explain exit in real and imagined markets, we compare persons who
currently own a business with persons who no longer own a business and persons










who aspire and take steps to start a business with persons who have given up these
entrepreneurial aspirations and efforts. In the next two sections we will discuss the
potential personal- and ecological-level drivers of exit in imagined and real markets.
2.1 Personal characteristics
Determining the effects of individual characteristics on imagined and real market exit
requires taking into account the effect of the specific variable on the probability of
experiencing imagined and real market conditions, respectively. Therefore, we sim-
ultaneously include these two principles in one model formulation. Hence, we are
also able to analyze the influence of individual characteristics on experiencing
imagined and real market conditions.
Risk tolerant persons are more likely to experiment. Thus, they are more likely to
consider and exploit nascent activities. Earlier research has already shown that risk
tolerance matters for having entrepreneurial preferences (Grilo and Thurik, 2005;
Grilo and Irigoyen, 2006) and entry into self-employment (Van Praag and Cramer,
2001; Cramer et al., 2002; Ekelund et al., 2005; Caliendo et al., 2009). It can also be
expected that they have a higher chance of once having closed a business because they
pursue less certain and, on average, lower quality opportunities than risk-averse
individuals. At the same time, because of the lower threshold of recognizing
an opportunity for risk-tolerant individuals, the exploitation of the recognized
opportunity could be not as easy as expected, which may lead to a higher likelihood
of exit in imagined markets.1
On the one hand, highly educated people are more likely to develop the necessary
skills for realizing their entrepreneurial ideas and running a business successfully.
However, on the other hand, they are also more likely to face high opportunity costs
in comparison to wage labor and thus exit. Both ex-ante and ex-post selections are
likely to be affected by opportunity costs (Amit et al., 1995), i.e. alternative job
market opportunities. Exit after business start-up is especially likely to be affected
by the aspiration level of the entrepreneur (Baldwin and Rafiquzzaman, 1995;
Gimeno et al., 1997). The outcome of the trade-off between improved skill levels
and higher opportunity costs due to high levels of education is an empirical issue.
With regard to nascent entrepreneurs, Parker and Belghitar (2006) found a negative
effect of education on exit, while Van Gelderen et al. (2005) found no effect of
education on exit. There has been more research on the effect of education on exit
in real markets: two studies have found a negative effect of education on entrepre-
neurial exit (Bruce, 2002; Burke et al., 2008), but other studies have either found no
effect (Taylor, 1999; Van Praag, 2003; Scha¨fer and Talavera, 2009) or have found a
positive effect (Blanchflower and Meyer, 1994). Given the unclear trade-off between
1The authors would like to thank one of the anonymous reviewers for suggesting this effect of risk
tolerance on exit in imagined markets.










improved skill levels and higher opportunity costs, we do not anticipate a clear-cut
effect of education upon entrepreneurial exit (Van der Sluis et al., 2005) in either
imagined or real markets.
Persons with self-employed parents will be more committed to entrepreneurship
due to both social norms and the entrepreneurial skills that they have acquired
(Aldrich and Kim, 2007). This means that they will be less likely to exit than
persons without self-employed parents. Lentz and Laband (1990) found that, for
self-employed individuals, acquisition of entrepreneurial human capital occurs
primarily through experience and that the sons and daughters of the self-employed
benefit greatly from early exposure to their parents’ business establishments and
subsequently decide to go into business themselves. Cooper (1993) found that
having parents who owned a business appeared to increase the probability of firm
survival, and Burke et al. (2008) found that a self-employed father increased persist-
ence in an entrepreneurial career.
Young persons are more likely to be adventurous and experimenting than older
people, which makes them more likely to think about becoming or take steps to
become an entrepreneur (Le´vesque and Minniti, 2006; Davidsson, 2006). This ‘age’
effect may largely be covered by levels of risk tolerance,2 or overconfidence (Forbes,
2005). Parker and Belghitar (2006) and Van Gelderen et al. (2005) found no signifi-
cant effect of age on exit in imagined markets. Once they have started, young people
are more likely to exit because they have less experience and more alternative labor
market opportunities. Several studies, however, found a negative effect of age on exit
in real markets (Evans and Leighton, 1989; Blanchflower and Meyer, 1994;
Holtz-Eakin et al., 1994; Taylor, 1999; Van Praag, 2003). This latter outcome can
be explained by the combined effect of two mechanisms: age increases the human
capital of the individual and thus should have a positive effect on the survival of the
business, and age lowers the possibility of returning to employment (due to fewer
labor market alternatives: Cooper, 1993), making the shift to a wage-earner career
less likely. Evans and Leighton (1989) found very high exit rates for young persons,
which reaches a plateau after the age of 30 years. Scha¨fer and Talavera (2009) found
that individuals are more likely to quit self-employment at young and elderly ages.
When we take the retirement age of individuals into account, we expect a slightly
U-shaped curve, with increasing chances of exit by sell-off (e.g. with a business
transfer) at the right-hand side of the curve.
2.2 Ecological characteristics
The ecologies in which entrepreneurs are active differ in their level of resource
munificence and competition, which are expected to have negative and positive
2In more general terms, neuropsychological research found that age is negatively related to risk
tolerance (Deakin et al., 2004).










effects on exit, respectively. Box (2008) stresses the importance of the influence of
environmental forces on exit. Munificent environments are likely to lower the
barriers to entry and the chances of exit. We expect that indicators of perceived
constraints in the environment are related to giving up entrepreneurial intentions
and efforts and to closing a business as well.
These perceived environmental constraints may be caused by a lack of resources in
the environment or by a lack of access to resources. This latter cause relates to the
legitimacy of the entrepreneur’s activities (Hannan and Freeman, 1984; Delmar and
Shane, 2004): in certain environments the activities of new firms are regarded as
relatively less reliable and accountable than in other environments. This constrains
their access to the necessary resources to realize a new firm and to survive in
competition with established firms. This legitimacy effect is most likely reflected in
the perceived lack of financial support and perceived difficulty of obtaining sufficient
information.
Market opportunities, resources, and competition are, in general, more con-
centrated in metropolitan and urban areas than in rural areas. The availability of
resources and/or social networks that provide access to these resources (Sørenson
and Sorenson, 2003; Stuart and Sorenson, 2003) makes it less likely that entrepre-
neurial intentions and efforts are constrained in metropolitan and urban areas.
The large concentration of entrepreneurs in these areas also lowers the ambiguity
attached to entrepreneurship and promotes its choice as a viable source of revenues
(Minniti, 2005). An interesting related research question is whether the high levels of
competition have a stronger effect on ex-ante selection than on ex-post selection.
Because of this competition element, metropolitan in particular, but also urban
areas, are likely to have a positive effect on exit in real markets (Huiban, 2010).
Competition is more likely to be experienced in real markets than in imagined
markets, so we do not expect an effect (or perhaps only a small effect) of the
competition element on giving up entrepreneurial intentions or efforts.3
Many studies on entrepreneurship and firm exit use evidence from a single
country to identify the role of economic institutions or policy. A cross-country set
of micro-level data provides better identification of the effect of different institu-
tional settings (Bartelsman et al., 2005; Reynolds et al., 2005). Welfare state institu-
tions tend to reduce economic incentives for entrepreneurship (Henrekson, 2005).
So, even if people are thinking about or taking steps toward starting a business in
countries with strong welfare states, they are more likely to give up their entrepre-
neurial intentions and efforts because these are less likely to pay off in comparison to
wage labor in such systems. Strong welfare states also discourage risky businesses,
3There might also be more job opportunities in urban areas, which has a positive effect on exit in
real markets (i.e. exchanging an entrepreneurial career for a better paid wage earner career).










and such environments may have a positive effect on the survival of existing
businesses.4
3. Data, measurement and method
The data we use come from the 2007 “Flash Eurobarometer Survey on
Entrepreneurship, No. 192” of the European Commission, originally consisting of
20,674 observations from 25 Member States of the European Union5 as well as
Iceland, Norway, and the United States. Randomized telephone interviews were con-
ducted by the Gallup Organization Hungary/Europe between January 9 and January
16, 2007 with respondents aged 15 years and over. In many European countries and
in the United States, the target sample size amounted to 1000 respondents. However,
in Austria, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Malta, Norway, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Sweden, the target size was
500. Small variations around these target sample sizes may occur across countries.6
The following question forms the basis for the explanation of both types of exit:
“Have you ever started a business or are you taking steps to start one?” In total, 20,474
out of 20,674 individuals answered either “no” (15,462) or “yes” (5012) to this
question. After having answered “no”, respondents were redirected to a follow-up
question in which they were confronted with the following three mutually exclusive
options for characterizing their answers (the number of observations corresponding
to each option is also given, next to the abbreviation we will use for each option in
the remainder of this manuscript):
“No, it never came to your mind to start a business.” (“never
considered”; 9812 observations)
“No, but you are thinking about it.” (“thinking”; 2298)
“No, you thought of it or you had already taken steps to start a business
but gave up.” (“gave up”; 2687)
Note that 665 respondents (out of 15,462) did not qualify their initial “no” answer.
Individuals that initially answered “yes” had to choose one of the following five
options:
“Yes, you are currently taking steps to start a new business.” (“taking
steps”; 770)
4Weak welfare states, like the United States and the UK, have less stringent regulations concerning
the start-up of firms, which leads to relatively low entry and exit costs (Nicoletti et al., 1999).
5Romania and Bulgaria (EU Member States since 2007) are not included in the data set.
6For more background information on this data set (including the English questionnaire), we refer
to the following website of the European Commission: http://europa.eu.int/comm/
enterprise/enterprise_policy/survey/eurobarometer_intro.htm.










“Yes, you have started or taken over a business in the last 3 years which
is still active today.” (“young business”; 629)
“Yes, you started or took over a business more than 3 years ago and it is
still active.” (“mature business”; 1299)
“Yes, you once started a business, but currently you are no longer an
entrepreneur since business has failed.” (“failure”; 505)
“Yes, you once started a business, but currently you are no longer an
entrepreneur since business was sold, transferred, or closed.” (“sell-off”;
1400)
Note that 409 individuals (out of 5012) did not answer this follow-up question.
Hence, for 19,400 individuals it is known to which of the eight categories they
belong.
Each of the eight options represents a different level of involvement in the entre-
preneurial process, ranging from no familiarity with self-employment at all to exit in
real markets. Grilo and Thurik (2008) refer to these categories as “engagement
levels”.7 The two engagement levels describing real exit distinguish between success-
ful entrepreneurs who retired, transferred their business (perhaps they have recog-
nized a better opportunity), or profitably sold their business, and entrepreneurs
with a failed business. The first type of real firm exit cannot be regarded as a
straightforward outcome of market selection.
Individuals that have given up their aspirations or efforts may have experienced
earlier real market conditions. Also, if a respondent does not answer “failure” or
“sell-off”, this does not necessarily mean that he/she had not closed a business before:
currently thinking about entrepreneurship or taking steps may mask prior (or pres-
ent) business ownership. Also, being a current business owner does not exclude
having closed a business before (as with serial or portfolio entrepreneurs; see
Westhead and Wright, 1998).
For all countries, the percentages across all engagement levels are given in Table 1.
Note that the total number of observations in this table equals 19,400. Clear
differences between the European countries and the United States can be observed.
In the United States, 30% never considered setting up a business, while in the
European countries this percentage amounts to 52. The “thinking” and “taking
steps” percentages in Europe are considerably lower than in the United States
(unweighted averages of 11% and 4% versus 21% and 9%, respectively).
Concerning imagined exit, 14% had given up his/her aspirations or efforts to start
a business in Europe, sharply contrasting the 9% for the United States. Furthermore,
large variation occurs in the “sell-off” category: the United States, the Scandinavian
countries, Cyprus, and Greece stand out with high percentages. Further inspection
7Note that Grilo and Thurik (2008) make no distinction between real exit due to business failure
and real exit due to sell-off.



























Austria 57 7 2 21 2 5 1 5 475
Belgium 63 6 3 9 2 7 2 7 897
Cyprus 40 15 3 12 5 11 4 11 493
Czech
Republic
49 13 4 18 3 8 3 3 910
Denmark 47 20 3 12 2 5 3 8 495
Estonia 59 9 6 9 4 8 3 3 451
Finland 56 6 2 10 3 9 2 12 419
France 57 10 3 17 2 4 1 7 983
Germany 48 12 4 20 4 6 2 5 966
Greece 36 15 2 14 8 11 4 10 989
Hungary 53 14 3 6 2 10 4 7 983
Iceland 41 14 5 9 4 14 2 12 442
Ireland 49 13 4 12 4 7 4 6 477
Italy 56 7 4 15 3 5 2 8 941
Latvia 50 25 6 1 3 6 3 6 451
Lithuania 61 14 6 4 2 5 3 4 471
Luxembourg 55 8 3 20 3 4 2 6 462
Malta 63 8 1 24 1 2 0 1 434
Netherlands 52 8 4 18 4 5 2 8 937
Norway 58 11 2 8 3 9 1 8 461
Poland 45 14 6 15 2 8 4 6 963
Portugal 58 4 3 15 5 5 3 7 969
Slovakia 43 27 5 12 2 5 3 4 479
Slovenia 55 13 1 18 2 3 2 5 492
Spain 57 8 3 14 3 6 3 6 964
Sweden 45 15 6 12 3 5 2 11 478
UK 47 8 5 20 3 5 2 9 971
Europe 52 11 4 14 3 7 3 7 18,453
United States 30 21 9 9 4 8 4 14 947
Europeþ
United States
51 12 4 14 3 7 3 7 19,400
Source: “Flash Eurobarometer Survey on Entrepreneurship, No. 192” (conducted in 2007).










shows that the differences between the eight post-communist Member States and
the other 19 European countries are relatively small (these percentages are omitted
from Table 1). For example, in the post-communist countries, 51% reported “never
considered”, while 52% gave this answer in the other European countries. The
“thinking” and “taking steps” categories represent 16% and 5% of the respondents
in the post-communist and 10% and 3% in the other European countries.
We realize that the “method of moment inequalities” to investigate market entry
and exit dynamics would be a sensible candidate for our purposes (Pakes et al.,
2005). The assumption of this method is that agents behave according to maximiza-
tion of their expected returns. An approximation of realized profits from the actual
choice strategy undertaken by the individual and at least one other feasible alterna-
tive is required. However, we do not have information about the expected profits of
the realized strategy or the choice that has not been undertaken, or about any other
approximation. Therefore, we will not use the method proposed in Pakes et al.
(2005). Instead, given the categorical nature of the data, we make use of a multi-
nomial logit model (McFadden, 1973) to examine how and in what way exit in
imagined markets differs from exit in real markets.
The advantage of using a multinomial logit model is that it includes all eight
engagement levels. For each engagement level, the model predicts the probability that
an individual belongs to that particular engagement level. Individuals belonging to
“never considered” cannot be neglected with respect to explaining the probability of
exiting the imagined or real market place. It may well be that respondents that have
never considered setting up a business have a likelihood (albeit probably small given
the small values of their explanatory variables) of being active in the imagined and/or
real market place.
First, we compare persons that gave up their entrepreneurial intentions or efforts
with persons that currently have entrepreneurial intentions or are taking steps to
start a business. In our multinomial logit set-up, we merge the engagement levels
“thinking” and “taking steps” and take these two engagement levels as the reference
category. Interpretation in a multinomial logit model is always done relative to a
particular reference category. Then, we are able to investigate the effects of the
personal and ecological characteristics on the odds (ratio of two probabilities) of
the engagement level “gave up” relative to the reference category (i.e. “thinking” and
“taking steps”). To be more precise, we attempt to clarify which personal and
ecological characteristics increase or decrease the likelihood that an individual has
exited the imagined market place relative to currently being active in this imagined
market place.
Second, we contrast persons that have closed their business, either successfully or
unsuccessfully, with persons that currently own a business. In this case, we merge the
engagement levels “young business” and “mature business” and take these two
engagement levels as the reference category in our multinomial logit model. The
analysis of exit in real markets amounts to two exercises: we do not only investigate










the impact of the personal and ecological characteristics on the odds of “failure”
relative to the reference category (i.e. “young business” and “mature business”), but
we also focus on the odds of “sell-off” relative to this reference category (see Table 2).
In sum, we perform a multinomial logit regression with six categories: “never
considered”, a combination of “thinking” and “taking steps”, “gave up”, a combin-
ation of “young business” and “mature business”, “failure”, and “sell-off”. First, the
focus will be on analyzing the odds of “gave up” relative to “thinking” and “taking
steps” to explain imagined exit. Second, we will focus on the odds of “failure” relative
to “young business” and “mature business” and subsequently, on “sell-off” relative to
“young business” and “mature business”. Our main analysis thus boils down to three
investigations with two reference categories. The very nature of the multinomial logit
model also gives us the opportunity to investigate which individual characteristics
have an effect on the selection into entrepreneurship. To be more precise, we will also
investigate the odds of “thinking” and “taking steps” relative to “never considered”
and the odds of “young business” and “mature business” relative to “never con-
sidered”. Note that the choice of the reference category does not influence the results
of the multinomial logit model.
The explanatory variables used in the present study can be divided into two types:
personal characteristics and ecological (environmental) characteristics.
Personal characteristics: gender, age, level of education, and self-employed parents.
Gender (male¼ 1; female¼ 0) and self-employed parents (at least one of the parents
is/was self-employed¼ 1; otherwise¼ 0) are the obvious dummy variables. The first
variable is only taken into account as a control variable. Age is measured as the
current age—in years—of the respondent (not necessarily at time of exit, which then
most likely happened at a younger age).8 We also include age squared to allow for
























Business owner Exit in real market
8Ideally, we would have had values of the explanatory variables at the time of exit. For example, we
acknowledge that age at the time of imagined or real exit is preferred as the explanatory variable
here, but we do not know how many years ago the exit took place.










non-monotonic relationships. “Age when finished full education” is used as a
continuous approximation of the level of education.9
Descriptive analyses reveal that 28% of the individuals in this sample have at least
one (former) self-employed parent. The averages of age and education are 46.96 and
19.81 years (with standard deviations of 16.84 and 6.18 years), respectively. These
numbers are based on 14,545 observations. Earlier, we have seen that 19,400
respondents specified their level of engagement in the entrepreneurial process.
Our estimation sample, however, will consist of 14,545 observations. This number
is retrieved such that no single observation contains missing values on any of the
variables that will be included in the analyses that follow. In other words, our multi-
nomial logit regression will be based on 14,545 observations. The difference of
4855 observations between the earlier sample of 19,400 observations and the present
estimation sample is thus the result of missing values for any of the variables that
will be used to explain imagined and real exit.
Next to these “usual suspects” in demographic research, we have also included an
often used entrepreneurial personality variable, namely risk tolerance. Risk tolerance
is captured by the following statement: “One should not start a business if there is a
risk it might fail”. For this statement the risk tolerance dummy takes value 1 if
“disagree” or “strongly disagree”, and 0 if “agree” or “strongly agree” is given as
response.10 The average value of this variable is 0.50.
Ecological characteristics: We have explicitly taken into account different elements
of the environment: the perceived environmental constraints, the degree of
urbanization (a proxy for resource munificence and competition), and the national
institutional system. The perceived environmental constraints are measured using
three variables: the perception of lack of available financial support, the perception of
complexity of administrative procedures, and the perception of lack of sufficient
information on setting up an own business. These variables are captured, respect-
ively, by the question: “Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree with
the following statements?” given the following statements:
“It is difficult to start one’s own business due to a lack of available
financial support.”
“It is difficult to start one’s own business due to the complex adminis-
trative procedures.”
9A small fraction of 319 individuals in the original sample responded that they never attended full
time education. These observations have value 12 for the education level to reflect possible entry to
the labor market. Also, all answers between 1 and 11 have been recoded into 12 (493 observations in
the original sample).
10Clearly, this is a crude indicator of risk attitudes and calling this dummy “risk tolerance” may be
abusive. Nevertheless, in the absence of a better measure, we believe it provides some information
on how taking risks is perceived by the respondent.










“It is difficult to obtain sufficient information on how to start a
business.”
For each statement a dummy variable is constructed. The dummy variables take
value 1 in the case of “agree” or “strongly agree” for the four statements, and 0 if
“disagree” or “strongly disagree” is answered. The averages are 0.79, 0.74, and 0.51,
respectively, across the estimation sample.
The degree of urbanization is measured by asking the respondent in which kind of
locality he/she lives. Three mutually exclusive answer categories are possible: metro-
politan zone, urban center, and rural zone. Rural zone is taken as the base category.
The percentages of metropolitan, urban, and rural areas in the estimation sample are
0.22, 0.43, and 0.36, respectively.
Finally, the country-specific institutional systems are taken into account using the
categorization of institutional systems by Esping-Andersen (1999) (see Table 3). In
this categorization, Liberal/Anglo-Saxon countries11 are taken as the base. Therefore,
the coefficients associated with these variables are to be interpreted as the impact of
being in the corresponding institutional system rather than being in Liberal/
Anglo-Saxon. The relative contribution of each institutional system to the estimation
sample is also given in Table 3 (i.e. the averages of the constructed variables).
4. Results
How can exit in imagined and real markets be explained? Table 4 presents the results
of the multinomial logit regression in terms of odds ratios. The estimates represent
Table 3 Categorization of national institutional systems
Category Countries Relative contribution
Corporatist/Social
Insurance




Southern Europe Cyprus, Greece, Malta, Portugal, Spain 0.21 (3126 obs.)
Post-communist Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,




Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden 0.10 (1505 obs.)
Liberal/Anglo-Saxona Ireland, United Kingdom, United States 0.14 (2006 obs.)
aUsed as reference category in regressions.
11This category is similar to the “Liberal Market Economy” in the “varieties of capitalism” literature
(Hall and Soskice, 2001; Casper and Whitley, 2004).










Table 4 Estimation results multinomial logit model explaining imagined and real exit
(odds ratios)
Type of exit Imagined exit Real exit due to
failure
Real exit due to
sell-off












Risk tolerance 0.831*** (0.053) 0.687*** (0.080) 0.862* (0.072)
Education 0.972*** (0.005) 0.985 (0.009) 0.982*** (0.006)
Self-employed parents 0.732*** (0.052) 0.598*** (0.078) 0.887 (0.075)
Male 0.949 (0.059) 0.789** (0.088) 0.728*** (0.058)
Age 1.082*** (0.012) 0.973 (0.025) 0.910*** (0.016)




0.983 (0.079) 1.574*** (0.233) 1.186* (0.113)
Perceived administrative
complexities
1.049 (0.077) 1.116 (0.145) 1.216** (0.111)
Perceived insufficient
information
0.992 (0.065) 1.052 (0.126) 0.972 (0.083)
Metropolitan 0.856* (0.073) 1.557*** (0.236) 1.136 (0.121)
Urban 0.879* (0.062) 1.315** (0.174) 1.048 (0.095)
Corporatist 2.095*** (0.209) 0.647** (0.127) 0.781** (0.097)
Southern Europe 2.043*** (0.221) 0.827 (0.157) 0.535*** (0.071)
Post-communist 0.756*** (0.077) 0.903 (0.163) 0.402*** (0.054)
Social democratic 1.056 (0.136) 0.656* (0.154) 0.918 (0.131)
Further statistics
Number of observations 14,545
McFadden R2 0.09
Nagelkerke R2 0.25
LR 2 (75 degrees of freedom) 3968.54 (P-value51%)
Log likelihood at intercepts 21,760.02
Log likelihood at convergence 19,775.75
Standard errors are between parentheses; estimated intercepts are not shown.
Estimates significantly different from unity at the 0.01 (***), the 0.05 (**), and the 0.10 (*)
level.










the impact of the personal and ecological variables on the odds (ratio of two prob-
abilities) of imagined or real exit relative to the appropriate reference category.12
More specifically, the first column of results in Table 4 refers to the explanation of
imagined exit: the estimates describe the impact of the corresponding variable on the
odds of “gave up” relative to “thinking” and “taking steps”. Given an estimate above
unity and holding all other variables equal, an increase in a variable raises the prob-
ability of belonging to the engagement level “gave up” as compared to the reference
category consisting of the engagement levels “thinking” and “taking steps”. The
opposite is true for an estimate below unity. The second column of results in
Table 4 focuses on the odds of “failure” relative to “young business” and “mature
business” while the last column of results explains the odds of “sell-off” relative
to “young business” and “mature business”. Standard errors are also displayed in
Table 4 next to asterisks denoting significant differences of the estimates from unity
at the 0.01 (***), the 0.05 (**), and the 0.10 (*) level.
In the present section, we will first elaborate on the specification of the multi-
nomial logit model. Subsequently, we present and discuss the effects of personal
characteristics on entrepreneurial exit in imagined and real markets. This will
be followed by a presentation and discussion of the effects of ecological
characteristics.
4.1 Model specification
The odds of any pair of categories in the multinomial logit model depend only on the
characteristics of the two categories under consideration and are independent of the
number of categories. This property is known as the independence of irrelevant
alternatives (IIA, McFadden, 1973). Several tests have been proposed to assess
whether this property can theoretically be sustained (McFadden et al., 1981; Small
and Hsiao, 1985; Hausman and McFadden, 1984). The performance of these tests has
been investigated by Fry and Harris (1996, 1998) and Cheng and Long (2007). The
latter authors even suggest (p.598) that “(. . .) tests of the IIA assumption that are
based on the estimation of a restricted choice set are unsatisfactory for applied
work.” Long and Freese (2006: 244) state that the tests above—that are based on
12The analysis of the odds of “gave up” versus “thinking” and “taking steps” contains respondents
that indicate to be self-employed at the same time. Next to the question on engagement levels the
questionnaire asks respondents to specify their current occupation: “As far as your current occupa-
tion is concerned, would you say you are self-employed, in paid employment, or would you say that you
are without a professional activity?”. It could be that these respondents (those that indicate to be self-
employed while being in “gave up”, “thinking”, or “taking steps”) are “imagined portfolio
entrepreneurs” in that they have taken steps or have thought about setting up a business next to
their present business. Excluding these imagined portfolio entrepreneurs (346 observations in the
original sample) does not result in different conclusions.










estimating restricted choice sets—can produce “contradictory results”. In our appli-
cation we expect, on theoretical grounds, the IIA property not to be a concern
because of the dissimilar structure of our engagement levels (Amemiya, 1981).
This dissimilar structure is emphasized by the fact that we are unable to combine
any pair of categories (Cramer and Ridder, 1991).
The IIA property originates from the fact that the underlying disturbance terms
of the categories are uncorrelated and homoscedastic by definition. This may
be an unrealistic assumption in our case as there is a possibility that common
omitted variables affect one or more engagement levels simultaneously. Alternative
models that allow for cross-categorical disturbance correlation include the multi-
nomial probit model (Hausman and Wise, 1978; for the relative benefits and
liabilities of multinomial logit and multinomial probit, see Dow et al., 2004), the
nested logit model (Domencich and McFadden, 1975; Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1985),
and the mixed logit model (Train, 2003). The multinomial probit model and
the mixed logit model cannot be considered in our context as we do not have
the availability of country-specific variables in our dataset, which are needed to
relax the zero correlation between disturbance terms. We abstain from using the
nested logit model here because one may think of multiple specific nesting struc-
tures of the engagement levels; choosing one such nesting would thus be subjective.
In this context, the following argument by Greene (2003: 727) applies: “There
is no well-defined testing procedure for discriminating among tree structures,
which is a problematic aspect of the model.” Also, the issue of uncorrelated distur-
bance terms remains present between categories in one branch in a nested logit
model.
Because it is difficult to define residuals in multinomial choice models, one has to
rely on pseudo R2 measures to assess the fit of these models. One such a measure has
been proposed by McFadden (1973) that compares the log likelihood of the model
with only intercept parameters with the log likelihood at convergence. As McFadden
(1979: 307) points out, the values of these types of indices “tend to be considerably
lower than those of the R2 index and should not be judged by the standards for a
‘good fit’ in ordinary regression analysis.” In our case, McFadden’s R2 amounts to
0.09 as can be seen in Table 4. Another definition has been proposed by Maddala
(1983), which was revised by Nagelkerke (1991) to allow R2 to lie between 0 and 1.
The Maddala R2 and Nagelkerke R2 equal 0.24 and 0.25 in our case, respectively.
Another method to assess the fit of the model is to examine the observed and
predicted frequencies of all categories. In the estimation sample, the true frequencies
are 0.46, 0.17, 0.15, 0.12, 0.03, and 0.08 for “never considered,” “thinking”/“taking
steps,” “gave up,” “young business”/“mature business,” “failure,” and “sell-off,” re-
spectively. For each individual we now compute the predicted probabilities for all
categories. Averaging these numbers across all individuals delivers predictions (0.46,
0.17, 0.15, 0.11, 0.03, and 0.08) that show huge resemblance with our previously
presented numbers.











Unambiguously, and in contrast to our expectations, risk tolerance appears to have a
negative influence on exit in imagined markets and on both types of exit in real
markets. Repositioning the multinomial logit model with another reference category
(i.e. focusing on the odds of “thinking” and “taking steps” relative to “never con-
sidered”) reveals that risk tolerance has a positive impact on having entrepreneurial
intentions or undertaking efforts to start a business (Grilo and Thurik, 2008). These
results are displayed in the first column of results in Table 5.
Table 5 Estimation results multinomial logit model explaining selection into entrepreneur-
ship (odds ratios)












Risk tolerance 1.400*** (0.074) 1.579*** (0.096)
Education 1.047*** (0.005) 1.033*** (0.005)
Self-employed parents 1.317*** (0.077) 1.805*** (0.114)
Male 1.631*** (0.085) 3.121*** (0.184)
Age 1.015* (0.009) 1.269*** (0.017)
Age2 0.999*** (0.000) 0.997*** (0.000)
Ecological determinants
Perceived lack of financial support 1.189*** (0.078) 0.880* (0.062)
Perceived administrative complexities 0.908 (0.055) 0.658*** (0.044)
Perceived insufficient information 0.962 (0.052) 1.024 (0.064)
Metropolitan 1.009 (0.070) 0.895 (0.071)
Urban 1.013 (0.059) 0.828*** (0.055)
Corporatist 0.471*** (0.039) 0.741*** (0.073)
Southern Europe 0.484*** (0.044) 1.272** (0.130)
Post-communist 1.087 (0.088) 1.356*** (0.136)
Social democratic 0.671*** (0.068) 1.058 (0.122)
Standard errors are between parentheses; estimated intercepts are not shown. Model statistics
are displayed in Table 4.
Estimates significantly different from unity at the 0.01 (***), the 0.05 (**), and the 0.10 (*)
level.










The impact of risk tolerance on entry into self-employment is illustrated in the
second column of results in Table 5, which concentrates on the odds of “young
business” and “mature business” relative to “never considered” (Grilo and Thurik,
2008). This impact is being “compensated” by the strong negative influence of risk
tolerance on “failure” relative to “young business” and “mature business” in
that an additional analysis shows that risk tolerant individuals are not more likely
to be in the “failure” engagement level relative to “never considered”. These
additional analyses also reveal that the odds of “gave up” relative to “never con-
sidered” and “sell-off” relative to “never considered” are significantly influenced
by risk tolerance.
Thus, given that one belongs to either of the two markets, risk tolerant individuals
(who are more likely to be present in these markets) are also less likely to exit.
The present research thus shows that risk tolerance not only discriminates between
(potential) entrepreneurs and those without any entrepreneurial activity, but it also
discriminates between individuals that currently experience imagined and real
market conditions and those that have exited either of the two markets.
A clear significant negative effect for education is found for exit in imagined as
well as from real markets due to sell-off. The importance of education might indicate
that higher educated persons are better able to recognize high value entrepreneurial
opportunities which lower the probability of exit in imagined markets. This strong
effect of ability seems to offset the high opportunity costs of entrepreneurship for
highly educated people. Hence, educational level does not only increase the prob-
ability that an individual undertakes serious activities to start a business (first column
of Table 5); it also facilitates the persistence of realizing these intentions and/or
efforts into business ownership given the lower probability of exiting the imagined
market (Table 4) and given the higher probability of selection into business
ownership (Table 5). An important observation in this context is that the odds of
“failure” relative to currently having a business are not significantly affected by the
education level.
According to our expectations, persons with self-employed parents are less likely
to give up their entrepreneurial intentions and efforts, and once they have started as a
business owner, they are less likely to fail. This might be explained by the indirect
learning effect, i.e. observing entrepreneurial actions of role models (Aldrich and
Kim, 2007). While Table 5 shows that respondents with a self-employed parent have
a much higher likelihood of having taken steps toward starting a business or of
having run a business, we can also conclude from Table 4 that respondents without
self-employed parents have a much higher likelihood of having given up these steps
or of having failed. The impact of this variable on entrepreneurial exit is so strong
that the odds of “gave up” relative to “never considered” and “failure” relative to
“never considered” are not significantly affected by having a self-employed parent.
Age seems to have a positive linear effect on exit in imagined markets (irrelevant
turning point at which the impact of age on the odds ratio becomes negative), and on










exit due to failure.13 Furthermore, there exists a U-shaped relationship between
age and the odds of “sell-off” relative to “young business” and “mature business”
(turning point at 32 years).
4.3 Ecological characteristics
While perceived environmental constraints are hardly related to exit, urban and
metropolitan locations have the expected negative effect on exit in imagined markets
(albeit only significant at 10%). Note that the degree of urbanization does not have
an influence on having entrepreneurial intentions and/or undertaking efforts to start
a business (first column of Table 5). Furthermore, being located in a metropolitan
or an urban area increases the odds of “failure” relative to “young business” and
“mature business”. Hence, the effect of real competition in metropolitan and
urban environments seems to be more relevant than the imagined effect.
Individuals in urban and metropolitan environments seem to hang on to their
entrepreneurial intentions much more and once they enter real markets they
more often fail.
We first note (based on Table 5) that all institutional regimes (relative to the
Anglo-Saxon regime) have an equal or lower odds of “thinking” and “taking steps”
relative to “never considered”. Put it differently, individuals in the Anglo-Saxon
regimes have the highest likelihood to undertake efforts to start a business.
Table 4 additionally shows that the corporatist regime has the expected positive
effect on exit in imagined markets: individuals in this welfare state regime thus
have fewer incentives to maintain their entrepreneurial intentions and efforts relative
to individuals in Anglo-Saxon regimes. Next to individuals in corporatist regions, it
also turns out that Southern Europeans are twice as likely to have given up entre-
preneurial intentions and/or efforts relative to individuals in Anglo-Saxon regimes.
We also see (last column of Table 5) that individuals in corporatist regimes have the
smallest probability of all regimes to own a business currently. Finally, and according
to our expectations, the corporatist welfare and social democratic welfare regimes
decrease the odds of “failure” versus “young business” and “mature business”,
relative to Anglo-Saxon countries.
Table 6 summarizes the empirical evidence of our analyses.14
13Additional analyses excluding the squared age term confirm this finding (the estimate belonging to
the linear age term is significantly different from unity at 5%).
14An interesting research question relates to changing patterns over time by conducting longitudinal
research methods. A starting point is to perform the same analysis with an older version of the
“Flash Eurobarometer Survey on Entrepreneurship”, i.e. No. 160 from 2004 which was used in Grilo
and Thurik (2005) and Van der Zwan et al. (2010). There is no distinction between real exit due to
business failure and due to sell-off in this 2004 version. The analysis of exit in imagined markets
(2007 results are in the first column of Table 4) establishes the following results. Concerning
personal characteristics we observe that risk tolerance, education, and self-employed parents do










5. Conclusion and discussion
We present evidence on the determinants of entrepreneurial exit in real and
imagined markets using a cross-sectional survey of some 20,000 individuals in
European countries and the United States. Prospective business owners enter an
imagined market when they start thinking about setting up a business or are
taking preparatory steps. The novelty of our approach is in the comparison of
ex-post selection (business failure in real markets) with ex-ante selection (in ima-
gined markets). We have assessed the role of personal and ecological characteristics
in the explanation of exit in real and imagined markets. Our analyses show that risk
tolerance and having a self-employed parent have significant negative relations with
exit in imagined markets and exit in real markets due to business failure. Ecological
characteristics related to urbanization and welfare state regimes seem to have con-
trasting effects on exit in imagined markets as compared to exit in real markets.
Urbanization has a negative effect on exit in imagined markets, but a positive effect
on exit in real markets. Strong welfare regimes have a positive effect on exit in
imagined markets, while they have a negative effect on exit in real markets.
Table 6 Empirical evidence concerning exit in imagined and real markets






Risk tolerance – – –
Education – 0 –
Self-employed parents – – 0
Male 0 – –
Age þ þ U-shaped
Perceived environmental constraints 0 Partly þ Partly þ
Metropolitan/urban – þ 0
Strong welfare state þ – –
not have significant effects (at 10%) in 2004, while we find clear negative effects in 2007. Age has
a positive linear effect on exit in imagined markets in both years. Furthermore, we see that
perceived environmental constraints are not related to imagined exit, which is also the case in
2007. Urban and metropolitan locations again have negative effects. We note that in 2004 all
institutional regimes (relative to the Anglo-Saxon regime) have higher odds of “gave up” versus
“thinking” and “taking steps”. The 2004 multinomial regression is based on 16,502 observations.
Finally, our focus is on the odds of “thinking” and “taking steps” versus “never considered” (2007
results are in the first column of Table 5). There are no qualitative differences between 2004 and
2007, except that being located in a metropolitan or in an urban area increases this odds in 2004
and that perceived lack of financial support is not of significant importance in 2004.










We could interpret our results from a “rational expectations” viewpoint:
prospective entrants objectively assess the returns of entering the market as an entre-
preneur. They make decisions on whether or not to enter as well as the timing and
mode of entry in a manner that seeks to maximize expected profit in an uncertain
environment (Helfat and Lieberman, 2002). While rational behavior of this sort may
be a reasonable first approximation, numerous studies suggest that entrants often
suffer from cognitive biases (Kahneman and Lovallo, 1993; Dosi and Lovallo, 1997).
Individuals may be overly optimistic about their own entrepreneurial abilities, which
would mean that such biases would contribute to “excessive” entry (i.e. relatively low
quality entrants). This seems especially relevant when certain explanatory variables
do not have an effect (or have a negative effect) on exit in imagined markets, but do
have an effect (or have a positive effect) on exit in real markets. Our analyses suggest
that the entry of individuals in metropolitan and urban areas might be too optimistic
(with a negative effect on imagined exit and a positive effect on real exit due to
failure). Camerer and Lovallo (1999) found evidence of excess market entry—entry
into crowded markets that offered slim success chances—ostensibly instigated by
individuals who held biased (e.g. overconfident) assessments of their competitive
abilities. This can be prevented, if potential entrepreneurs become better informed
about their chances of entrepreneurial success (and thus will be more likely to “give
up”). The reverse phenomenon—under optimism—might also be prevalent: our
analyses suggest that corporatist and Southern European welfare regimes seem to
have this effect on their inhabitants.
Exit has been the central topic in this article. One of the key axioms in economics
is that the least viable (productive) businesses will be eliminated due to selection
pressures in the market, i.e. market selection (Bellone et al., 2008). As stated before,
entrepreneurial exit does not necessarily equate to business exit in two ways: first,
so called habitual entrepreneurs can exit a business while continuing with another
business, and second, entrepreneurs can exit their business while the business
continues to exist (the “sell-off” category in our analyses). In this article we have
made the distinction between entrepreneurial exit due to business failure and due to
sell-off. In that sense, we have addressed a shortcoming in much of the exit literature
that has equated business failure with sell-offs within an overall category of business
exit. However, we also know that many entrepreneurs stick to a marginal business—
and thus an entrepreneurial career—because they have relatively low aspiration
levels, while a subset of entrepreneurs close down profitable businesses because
these businesses do not reach the high aspiration levels of these ambitious (often
human capital rich) entrepreneurs (Gimeno et al., 1997). Even though we do not find
a related positive effect of education on exit, the heterogeneity in aspiration
levels questions the universal appropriateness of the evolutionary mechanism of
“survival of the fittest”. Some authors have also emphasized the evolutionary
mechanism of “selection via differential growth” (Nelson and Winter, 1982).
Such a mechanism is outside the scope of our empirical analyses. Even though










we recognize the heterogeneity in businesses (ranging from marginal self-employed
to the high-growth innovative industry leader; cf. Santarelli and Vivarelli, 2007),
which is not taken into account in our analyses, we do still value the prevalence
of the “survival of the fittest” mechanism. In a recent overview of the empirical
industrial economics literature on growth and exit, Coad (2009) concludes that
selection mainly operates via elimination of the least productive businesses and
that the mechanism of selection via differential growth does not appear to be
as strong.
Even though this article’s main contribution is to the evolutionary economics
research field, it contains some evidence that confirms the neo-classical approach to
entrepreneurship. Although entrepreneurship is largely neglected in this branch of
economics (see Bianchi and Henrekson, 2005), there are some key contributions
which “explain” entrepreneurship by the risk preferences of individuals (Kihlstrom
and Laffont, 1979). The empirical evidence in this article confirms the importance of
risk tolerance in stepping up the “entrepreneurial ladder” (Van der Zwan et al., 2010)
and more specifically, as a driver of entrepreneurial persistence in imagined and
real markets.
Our article also contributes to the institutional literature on the effects of welfare
state regimes (Esping-Andersen, 1999) and varieties of capitalism (Hall and Soskice,
2001) in a new way. This literature has largely neglected entrepreneurship or has only
focused on entry (Casper, 2007). We have shown in this article that these institutions
are also an important element in the explanation of entrepreneurial exit in real and
imagined markets. The Anglo-Saxon regime, which is generally seen as the most
fertile institutional system for entrepreneurship (Bosma et al., 2008), seems to
have a negative effect on exit in imagined markets in comparison with the corporatist
and Southern Europe regimes having positive effects, while the corporatist regime
seems to have a negative effect on exit in real markets. Our findings redirect attention
to the role of non-market selection environments next to market selection
environments (Nelson and Winter, 1982). Future research should include a better
categorization of the institutional environment next to the welfare state typologies
(Freytag and Thurik, 2007).
An important indirect measure of market selection is captured by our ecological
variables “metropolitan” and “urban” environments. In these high density environ-
ments competition between businesses is known to be much fiercer than in low
density, rural environments (Audretsch, 1998; Canie¨ls, 2000; Fritsch and Mueller,
2008; Van Stel and Suddle, 2008). We find that individuals do not seem to let their
aspirations be affected by this competition, and once they have entered the real
market, their businesses are more likely to fail in metropolitan and urban environ-
ments than in rural environments. This may be interpreted as evidence for the
prevalence of overoptimistic entrepreneurs in high density areas, in which the
barriers to entry are (perceived to be) relatively low (Hoover and Vernon, 1959)
and thus might lure relatively many low quality entrepreneurs into the market, who










subsequently face the strong selection pressure in these highly competitive environ-
ments. More research is needed into the specific nature and effects of urban and
metropolitan environments on different aspects of the entrepreneurial process
(Bosma, 2010).
This article is one of the first steps into a research field of entrepreneurial
decision-making in imagined and real markets. Further studies may build on our
explorations and provide more specific variables and longitudinal research methods,
and experimental research methods, in order to trace the causes of decision-making
that precedes entrance into the market by entrepreneurs.
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